Moral traditions, critical reflection, and education in a liberal-democratic society by Cremaschi, Sergio Volodia Marcello
 MORAL TRADITIONS, CRITICAL REFLECTION,  
AND EDUCATION IN A LIBERAL-DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 
 
 
Sergio CREMASCHI 
 
 
 
1. POLITICS, THAT IS, ETHICS 
 
If, then, there is some end of the things we do, which we desire for its own 
sake [...] clearly this must be the good and the chief good. Will not the 
knowledge of it, then, have a great influence on life? […] If so, we must try, 
in outline at least, to determine what it is, and of which of the sciences or ca-
pacities it is the object. It would seem to belong to the most authoritative art 
and that which is most truly the master art. And politics appears to be of this 
nature.1 
 
As the quote illustrates, the very name “ethics” was still unknown to Ar-
istotle, and what has been later named ethics is named by him politics. 
This is not a detail, neither is to be explained away by such pseudo-
Hegelian considerations as that Aristotle has not yet reached the genuine 
concept of the person or the individual and is still bound to reasoning in 
terms of an undivided community.  
On the contrary, Aristotle had a clear idea of a practical part of phi-
losophy, as opposed to a purely theoretical part, the former being the one 
that not merely satisfies our thirst for knowledge but also helps us in be-
coming better human beings. He had a clear idea of its subdivision into 
three levels, which in the Aristotelian tradition have been dubbed monas-
tica, oeconomica, and politica. Note that the threefold division was still 
alive at Christian Wolff’s times, in the eighteenth century. Thus, it was 
no strange idea that the whole of practical philosophy might be named 
after the most comprehensive of its three levels, namely politics. But 
politics as such was, for Aristotle and his followers up to the nineteenth-
century discovery of Realpolitik, a kind of discourse about the proper 
goals for human action and the good, and indeed the wider context within 
which any discourse about goals and the good should be located. 
It is no novelty that politics, from the beginning of the eighteenth 
century on, has been increasingly understood in terms of a technique, 
more or less as the continuation of war by other means. It is also well-
known how, in the aftermath of World War II, a revival of Aristotelian 
politics as “practical philosophy” has taken place in Germany thanks to 
                                                      
1 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, 1094a 18-1094b 2. 
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such writers as Joachim Ritter, Hans-Georg Gadamer and others, and in 
the United States thanks to Leo Strauss and his school. Much of the spe-
cific claims advanced by these writers are highly questionable, yet one 
point is a new/old idea that can be hardly questioned, namely that norma-
tive discourse, value judgments, prudential discernment need be exer-
cised firstly about mankind’s lot, since no Course of History is out there 
taking care of it. In a word, the new/old rather obvious idea is that politics 
is ethics, and any ethic that would be careful in not trespassing into poli-
tics would be no ethics at all. 
In the real world, and more in detail in the world of educational in-
stitutions, such new awareness has produced a couple of distinct phe-
nomena. The first is a number of attempts, perhaps more marked in Euro-
pean countries that have overcome at some point a totalitarian regime, of 
introducing some kind of political education as a distinct subject in 
school curricula. Examples of this tendency are the institution in Italy 
after the fall of Fascism of “civic education,” a subject with a somewhat 
uncertain status, somewhere in between a study of the Constitution and 
the institutions of the democratic Republic and a kind of education into 
democratic values. In post-Franco Spain an analogous subject was intro-
duced, formerly named “knowledge of the Constitution” and more recent-
ly “education to citizenship.”  
 
2. THE TEACHING OF “NATURAL MORALITY”  
 IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE 
 
There was a time in European history, from the middle of the fifteenth 
century to the end of the eighteenth, when the study of “natural morality” 
was believed to be the focus of a humanistic/secular education. This tra-
dition began in Florence at the times of Rinascimento and gradually 
spread toward Northern Europe. 
In the Middle Ages, within the framework of Scholasticism, there 
was hardly any teaching of ethics as a separate subject. Ethics was basi-
cally encapsulated within a theological sub-discipline, namely the doc-
trine of the virtues, both natural and “theological.” Yet, something hap-
pened that paved the way to the Renaissance revolution, that is, between 
the thirteenth and the fourteenth centuries a revival of practical philoso-
phy took place gradually in the “minor” faculty, the faculty of arts, car-
ried out by the mostly laymen magistri of this faculty. The revival was a 
consequence of the rediscovery of a few Greek ethical works, first among 
them Aristotle’s Nichomachean ethics. 
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Aquinas, while working within the framework of theological ethics, 
made a decisive – and still not fully appreciated – improvement on Aris-
totelian ethics, and Scotus and William of Ockham amended and devel-
oped several points in Aquinas’s doctrine. The problem with Aquinas 
was that, while he was clear enough about the claim of existence of a 
“natural” morality (as contrasted with “revealed” morality) accessible to 
every human being thanks to the light of reason, no separate treatment of 
such morality was deemed necessary, and it was presented as a kind of 
introduction to the treatment of the natural virtues, to be crowned by the 
discussion of the theological ones. 
In the fifteenth century, within the framework of a reaction against 
Scholasticism by lay literati, ethics had a fresh start, at once building on 
medieval practical philosophy and reading the classical works in a new 
key. The Florentine literati started thinking of moral philosophy as a 
branch of Studia humanitatis, that is, a set of sub-disciplines ranging 
from rhetoric to grammar, philology and law and supposedly aimed at 
shaping the character of a wise man and a good citizen. This implied that 
stress was laid not so much on ethics as a philosophical discipline in a 
technical sense but instead on “moral discourse” as a part of humanities, 
which in turn were meant to be the path to a “philosophical” (that is, 
comparatively secular, albeit compatible with the Christian faith, and 
besides enlightened and virtuous) way of living. Writings by such authors 
as Xenophon, Isocrates, Lucianus, Plutarcus, Theofrastus, Sallustius, 
Titus Livius and Tacitus were assumed to belong to moral discourse, and 
among professional philosophers Cicero and Seneca, that is, those who 
were closer to the rhetorical tradition, enjoyed the widest popularity. A 
tension emerged between the early Renaissance rhetorical approach to 
moral discourse and the later Renaissance programs for a reformed scien-
tific ethics (as exemplified by Descartes, Mersenne, Spinoza, and 
Hobbes), but such tension should not be overstressed, since there was a 
shared understanding of the goals and comparatively secular character of 
moral discourse. 
It is against this background that the immense popularity of Cice-
ro’s De officiis during three centuries, as well as the drastic demise of 
such popularity at about 1800, may be fully appreciated. This work in 
fact became the basic reading for future members of the educated elite. It 
was praised by virtually everybody up to Voltaire, until it started being 
underrated at the beginning of the nineteenth century as being, at best, not 
philosophical enough and, at worst, simply shallow. It may be worth re-
minding that it had been conceived by Cicero as a synthesis of moral 
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doctrines that he believed to be shared ground for almost all philosophi-
cal schools, Epicureanism excluded, even if Panetius the Stoic was his 
main source. In Cicero’s strategy a system of normative ethics might be 
presented without expatiating on theoretical foundations for two reasons: 
the first was his own middle-Academic theory of knowledge, i.e. proba-
bilism, which provided a reason why doctrines should be accepted while 
still waiting for a final argument, since we may hope to provide at best 
probable proofs, and the second was consensus between major schools 
about a number of doctrines.  
These were a distinction between absolute duty and relative duty, or 
between the right (kathòrtoma), and social duty (kathékon).2 The distinc-
tion yielded some kind of escape-way for normal people who choose to 
live a normal life in human society while avoiding the early Stoics’ 
choice to retreat from the world. “Social duty” amounts to pursuing the 
honestum, or what is convenient and appropriate, including four basic 
goods, namely wisdom, or love of knowledge; social feeling, or preserva-
tion of human society implying distributive justice and mutual loyalty; 
magnanimity, or strength of mind; self-control.3 Virtue, consisting in 
“nature itself when led to perfection,”4 or in reason as the distinctive hu-
man faculty,5 belongs to the domain of honestum. Virtue is plural, and in 
fact it includes the four basic virtues listed by Plato that were to become 
known as the “cardinal” virtues: wisdom, understood in probabilistic 
terms, which implies that prudence is a virtue also in theoretical matters, 
and accordingly assent to unfounded beliefs should be denied and useless 
speculations should be avoided; justice understood as including benevo-
lence and based on the assumptions of natural sociability and equality; 
strength of mind; and self-control.6  
An important change within the Humanistic tradition was the sev-
enteenth-century revival of natural law theory. It implied a less drastic 
break than several among its proponents wanted us to believe in so far as, 
firstly, the very idea of natural law was an item from the Ciceronian lega-
cy, secondly, the doctrine held by Grotius and Pufendorf owed something 
to Spanish baroque Scholasticism. Besides, even if it were true that the 
proponents of the new natural law theory were influenced by the above-
mentioned “Cartesian” programs of reforming moral philosophy on the 
                                                      
2 Cicero, De officiis, 1.1.8. 
3 Ibid., 1.5.15.  
4 Ibid., 2.5.17.  
5 Ibid., 1.15.49. 
6 Ibid., 1.6.18-19; 1.17.53-58; 1.17.29; 1.19.62; 1.27.93.  
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blueprint of natural philosophy, and notably Pufendorf was Hobbes’s 
critical follower, all this did not imply any drastic break with Ciceronian-
ism. The reason is that Cicero was not just a rhetorician, but was first of 
all a Middle-Academic philosopher, a proponent of probabilism, a theory 
of knowledge that was rather compatible, albeit not with Cartesianism, at 
least with Baconianism, that is, with one among the philosophical pro-
grams inspiring the seventeenth-century “new science.” 
Samuel von Pufendorf was the author of De jure naturae et gentium 
(1672),7 where a modified version of Grotius’s natural-law theory was 
presented, less objectivist and more constructivist in its foundations, be-
ing grounded in a kind of (non-strictly theological) voluntarism like 
Hobbes and Locke. Pufendorf’s theory up to the time of the French Revo-
lution was assumed to be the paramount account of modern natural law 
theory and the doctrinal background for modern political revolutions. 
Precisely for this reason, after the French Revolution, Pufendorf fell sud-
denly from his high position into oblivion as an effect of Hegel’s, Ben-
tham’s, and even Kant’s criticism of natural law. 
A remarkable circumstance is that Pufendorf, after De jure, pub-
lished a shorter work, De officio hominis et civis (1673), which amounted 
to a simplified version of the former, where precisely the theoretical 
foundations of the doctrine were given for granted, and normative ethics 
only was illustrated in a rather detailed way.8 Pufendorf advances three 
main theoretical claims. The first, taken from Grotius, is the universal 
validity of natural law, and this implies that the latter is based on Reason 
instead of Authority. An implication is that natural law is different from 
positive laws as well as from moral theology, both requiring acknowl-
edgement of some previous authority. Another is that no distinction on 
principle exists between ethics and natural law. His second claim is that a 
science of natural law is made possible by the fact that human capacity to 
know the natural law, the Original Sin notwithstanding, is still alive, or 
that “our knowledge of this law, yet, may be named natural in so far as its 
necessary truth may be proved by mental processes or by natural rea-
son.”9 His third claim is that we can reconstruct the natural law only by 
an a priori way, not by an a posteriori or empirical way like Grotius, and 
even less by tracing the good or bad consequences of human actions like 
                                                      
7 Pufendorf, S. von (1998) De jure naturae et gentium, 2 vols., ed. by F. Böhling. Berlin: 
Akademie Verlag. 
8 Pufendorf, S. von (1997) De officio hominis et civis, ed. by G. Hartung. Berlin: Akademie 
Verlag. 
9 Ibid., Book II, chap. III, § 20. 
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proto-consequentialist Richard Cumberland. We should start with obser-
vation of traits shared by human beings in order to single out a core of 
unchanging normative principles and then from these we should infer 
more detailed prescriptions.10  
On the above theoretical basis, Pufendorf bases his claim that a set 
of prescriptions may be justified. The first is the prescription of sociabil-
ity. He declares that human beings never lived outside social life, since 
the state of nature was, unlike Hobbes, an original peaceful condition. 
There are indeed kinds of human society, like that of American Indians, 
that are closer to the state of nature, but human beings need a more com-
plex social life because of their weakness.11 Human beings are marked by 
both a need for help and an ability to produce rules. Out of this twofold 
character of human nature the first precept of natural law follows, namely 
“every human being should have, as far as he can, a friendly attitude to-
wards other human beings.”12 Such a basic prescription provides the logi-
cal premise for more detailed ones. There is a rule for deriving prescrip-
tions from the overarching law of sociability, namely, that if we are 
bound to pursuing some end we are also bound to pursuing means to such 
end, and thus “everything that necessarily follows from such sociable 
attitude should be assumed to be prescribed by the law of nature.”13 By 
this rule an obligation follows to learn a habit of refraining from damag-
ing others, a duty to benefit them, a duty to improve our talents, a duty to 
give others free access to those things we can give them at no cost. The 
mentioned prescriptions are dictates of reason established by observation 
and rational inquiry on human nature. A theological postulate adds nor-
mative force to such dictates and makes the phrase “natural laws” appro-
priate, namely that human beings were created by God with such disposi-
tions in order to make co-operation and social life possible. On the one 
hand, the postulate makes the shift from is to ought possible and, on the 
other, it does not play the function of a starting-point for deduction of 
moral prescriptions from any divine command. This implies that Pufen-
dorf’s doctrine may not be fairly deemed to fall under Kant’s censure of 
“heteronomy.”  
The De officio became an immensely popular work, the text-book 
for virtually any educated European teenager for 150 years. In fact, from 
                                                      
10 Pufendorf, S. von (1996) “An Hohan Christian von Boineburg 13.1.1677,” in Briefwech-
sel, ed. by D. Döring. Berlin: Akademie Verlag: 24-27.  
11 Pufendorf, De officio hominis et civis, Book II, chap. II, § 14. 
12 Ibid., Book II, chap. III, § 15. 
13 Ibid. 
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its original language, Latin, it was translated into French, Italian, Danish, 
Spanish, and Russian. Yet, after 1800 it was soon forgotten, firstly be-
cause it had acquired the image of a dangerous work, a Jacobin manual, 
secondly because Kant forced it into the pigeonhole containing “heteron-
ymous” natural law theories, thirdly because Hegel labelled natural law 
theory as anti-historical nonsense, and last of all because natural law the-
ory was defined by Bentham as “nonsense upon stilts.”  
The third and final step in the story of the teaching of natural mo-
rality is an unwritten work by Kant, namely his “moral catechism.” This 
Kantian project is, on the one hand, an example of what a popular version 
of natural morality would have been. On the other hand, the circumstance 
that the project was abandoned as soon as it was formulated by Kant, that 
nobody ever tried to write primary-school handbooks of morality, and 
that no government or – as far as I know – no independent educational 
institution ever tried to bring Kant’s project into practice, illustrates well 
how far the path undertaken between the fifteenth and the eighteenth 
centuries was dramatically interrupted at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century.  
The mentioned moral catechism was not one of Kant’s unpublished 
works. It was instead one of his “unwritten doctrines.” The moral cate-
chism was in fact a work Kant himself never set out to write but just a 
subject he wanted to be introduced into basic education. Kant’s “pure” 
moral philosophy, that is Kantian ethics as presented in the Groundwork 
and the Critique of Practical Reason, was meant to cover just one half of 
practical philosophy, the other half being “empirical moral philosophy” 
or “moral anthropology.” This discipline was meant to carry out an em-
pirical study of man not from a theoretical but from a “practical” point of 
view. Its subject matter is “the subjective conditions in human nature that 
may help or hinder compliance with the moral law.”14 Kant urges that 
morality cannot really exist “without anthropology,”15 for you have to 
“know first the moral agent in order to realize whether he is able to do 
what he is expected to do,”16 and any morality that would try to ignore 
anthropology would be “just an idea, or a purely speculative subject.”17  
                                                      
14 Kant, I. (1902) Metaphysik der Sitten (1797,) in Kant’s gesammelte Schriften, ed. by the 
Berlin-Brandenburgischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Berlin : Meiner & de Gruyter, 
(abbr. Ak), vol. VI: 217. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Kant, I. Moralphilosophie Collins, in Ak, vol. XXVII\1: 244. 
17 Ibid. 
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A presentation of Kant’s anthropology is offered in the Anthropol-
ogy in a Pragmatic Outlook. The title reveals that Kant intends to present 
it not directly as an auxiliary discipline of ethics, but instead as a part of 
that “knowledge of the world” which is required as a means to happiness. 
But, since the quest for happiness carries the growth of civilization as an 
unintended outcome, and since civilization is a pre-condition to moraliza-
tion, the discipline’s true goal is the formation of character, understood as 
a “transformation of one’s own way of thinking.” The later is the decisive 
aspect of the “doctrine of method” of practical reason, that is the doctrine 
of the “way” (Greek: odos) to virtue.18 Kant assumes that virtue can be 
taught, but also that such a teaching does not consist in information about 
duties and even less in exhortation to their practice. He adds that teaching 
virtue implies exercise through a never-ending fight against the “inner 
enemy,” but also that such exercise would be meaningless without a for-
mer decision for virtue and against vice.19 Such a teaching may not be 
given through lectures but should be carried out through dialogue be-
tween the teacher and the pupil, aimed at helping the pupil’s own discov-
ery of moral truths.20 And yet the dialogical method cannot be displayed 
in a void, without any previous notion; a preliminary step is provided by 
some basic learning, not acquired in an “acromatic” way, that is, by lec-
turing, but instead in an “erotematic” one, that is, through questioning, 
but still addressing the pupil’s memory, not yet his reason as the dialogi-
cal method will do. 
 
The first and necessary doctrinal tool by which a still uneducated pupil can be 
taught the doctrine of virtue is a moral catechism. This should come before 
religious catechism and should not be included, as a purely accidental item, 
among other items of religious instruction, but should be taught instead sepa-
rately and as a self-standing whole; for only by means of purely moral princi-
ples the shift from the doctrine of virtue to religion can be made21.  
 
Contents can be derived “from reason, as it is shared by every human 
being,”22 and the catechism should cover all virtues and vices and should 
be compiled in such a way as to suggest constantly the idea that the moti-
vating force of duty is never grounded in advantages or disadvantages for 
                                                      
18 Kant, I. Anthropologie in Pragmatischer Sicht (1798,), in Ak, vol. VII: 291-295; see also 
the “Methodenlehre der reinen praktischen Vernunft,” in Kritik der praktischen Vernunft 
(1788,) in Ak, vol. V: 149-163 ; and the “Ethische Methodenlehre,” in Metaphysik der Sitten: 
477-485. 
19 Kant, Metaphysik der Sitten: 477. 
20 Ibid.: 478. 
21 Ibid.  
22 Ibid.: 479. 
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the agent, and even for other people, but solely in the pure moral princi-
ple.  
Virtue may be learned and practiced not so much through intellec-
tual learning as by imitation. The latter depends on sensibility, not on the 
intellect, and its force lies in the force of example as standard (Exempel) 
as distinguished from example as anecdote (Beispiel). Such a motivating 
force, yet, goes beyond basic imitation mechanisms, since a living Ex-
empel gives us a proof “of the possibility of acting according to duty.”23 
Accordingly, it does not consist in comparison with any other human 
being (as he actually is), but just in comparison with the idea of human-
kind, or with the idea of how a human being should be. The final goal is 
neither that of teaching a theory, not to say a “technical doctrine” for 
problem-solving, nor that of improving habits, but instead producing a 
radical transformation in the individual’s “way of thinking.”24 This is the 
reason why moral education, instead of just fighting vices, should start 
with a “conversion in the way of thinking, the building of a character.”25 
This is why moral theory is no more than a kind of “geometry” of morali-
ty while real-world or morality is a matter of judgment, moral motivation 
depends on the force of Example, and the good moral agent is not an 
agent trained to applying rules but instead an agent who has learned to 
interpret situations, that is to “see” the one salient moral characteristic in 
a state of affairs, or to answer the question: “what is really going on?”  
 
3. AFTER THE ENLIGHTENMENT: RELIGION INSTEAD OF ETHICS 
 
In nineteenth-century Europe a few processes started, both at the level of 
the history of ideas and at the level of social history, and they influenced 
each other and mutually reinforced each other’s effects. 
Firstly, a climate of suspicion against eighteenth-century ideas and 
ideals established itself. It went with Romanticism, Idealism, and Histori-
cism, not to mention cruder kinds of Traditionalism, all of which tended 
to deny any validity to universal claims and to attack allegedly a-
historical doctrines. The rights of man, natural law, rational or natural 
morality became targets for opprobrium. Strangely enough, also Utilitari-
anism and Kantian Ethics, that were in different ways the heirs of the 
Enlightenment tradition, contributed to this campaign against such au-
                                                      
23 Ibid.: 480; on the role of Exempel in Kantian ethics, or better, in Kant’s “unwritten ethical 
doctrines,” see Ferrara, A. (2008) The Force of the Example. Explorations in the Paradigm 
of Judgment. New York: Columbia University Press, ch. I. 
24 Ibid.: 411; see also Anthropologie: 294-5. 
25 Kant, I. Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft (1793,) in Ak, vol. VI: 
55.  
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thors as Pufendorf, albeit for reasons opposite to those endorsed by the 
counter-Enlightenment camp. The combined effect was nonetheless 
oblivions of the natural morality tradition.  
Secondly, apart from the Austrian Empire and Scotland, where a 
universal education system, either state-based or run by local municipal 
governments or “parishes,” had been established in the second half of the 
eighteenth century, in most European countries a general primary educa-
tion system was established during the nineteenth century. One of the 
basic questions for which a solution was sought from the very beginning 
was that of the place for religious instruction in such a system.  
In Britain, a country where an awareness of religious pluralism 
could less easily be denied than elsewhere, the most enlightened minds 
tended to converge on a compromise, namely inter-confessional Christian 
education. This was the proposal endorsed by so different proponents as 
Richard Whately, an Anglican Bishop, and Sarah Porter née Ricardo, a 
sister of the economist David Ricardo, a novelist and essayist who was a 
member of the Liberal elite. Such a solution was commendable for being 
an attempt to overcome the identification between the Church of England 
and the State, but it strikingly left out of sight non-Christian minorities 
including the Jewish community whence Sarah Ricardo herself came.  
In most European countries, except France, the obvious solution 
was believed to be religious instruction in the prevailing Christian Con-
fession. Among them the most liberal version of such a solution was 
gradually introduced in the Austrian Empire, as far as, at least at the eve 
of World War I in Austro-Hungarian Gymnasiums two hours a week in-
struction in the “Mosaic Faith” were scheduled for Jewish students. In 
France in 1905 an absolute separation of State and Church was estab-
lished and the teaching of religion as such was banned from public educa-
tion.  
In the course of the above process, no mention of any teaching of 
morality as distinguished from religious education in Kant’s sense was 
ever made. A need for religious instruction was assumed as a matter of 
fact, with the modest amendments of the British early solution of inter-
Confessional instruction, the Austrian late solution of confessional plural-
ism, and the striking French “republican” exception. The vague idea was 
still cherished here and there by some radical Democrat that education 
should include some teaching of the “duties of man,” but it was never 
taken too seriously. The ruling elites, increasingly secularized and indeed 
in overt conflict with the Christian Churches, tended everywhere – with 
the remarkable exception of France – to think that, facing the social issue, 
 MORAL TRADITIONS, CRITICAL REFLECTION, AND EDUCATION… 179 
 
tendencies to Durkheimian “anomie” as a result of urbanization, and dif-
fusion of socialist ideas, the local prevailing religion was the easiest 
means of “educating” the masses to decent behaviour. 
A different parallel discussion would deserve a remarkable amount 
of space about the way of conceiving subjects as history, literature and, in 
higher education, philosophy. The fact that in virtually all countries in 
Continental Europe the school was conceived in terms of State school 
implies, in the historical context, that history was conceived as culminat-
ing with National History. On the other hand, literature was National 
Literature, aimed at cultivating the myth of a National spiritual heritage, 
and understood as a means of imbibing pupils with supposedly peculiar 
(Italian, German…) feelings, moral traits, and virtues.  
In short, my suggestion is that the result of the compromise be-
tween the ruling elites and the Churches was religion as a vehicle of val-
ues and models of behaviour for the uneducated masses, and the bulk of 
education as a means of manipulating the masses into a supposedly 
shared legacy of national values.  
One word may be added on the teaching of philosophy in Gymna-
siums and equivalent kinds of high schools. With the remarkable excep-
tion of France, where the systematic teaching of philosophy by sub-
disciplines survived, the German model of Philosophy as the History of 
Philosophy prevailed, and the subtle message this teaching suggested to 
future elites was that the course of history, both intellectual and political, 
was tantamount to the Coming of Reason and the only Morality and Reli-
gion of the educated (male) man was adhesion to this course, or faith in 
an identity of freedom and necessity. 
As a result of a story of fight and compromise between the ruling 
elites and the leadership of Christian Churches, three parallel processes 
took place. 
1. Normative ethics, or natural morality, that had been a distinct subject 
in the education of European elites from the Renaissance times to the end 
of the eighteenth century, disappeared as such, being partly allotted to the 
Churches via the teaching of religion in State School, and partly absorbed 
by the study of history and literature, assumed to be channels for imbib-
ing younger generations with the shared values of the State, the Nation, 
or the People. Normative ethics as an academic subject became either a 
battlefield for ideological wars (like the utilitarian campaign for the New 
Morality, the religious conservative campaign against the modern demise 
of moral values) or somewhat of a taboo (like the historicist neo-Idealist 
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view of Philosophy, that is the History of Philosophy, as the educated 
man’s Religion and Morality).  
2. Religion, or better the prevailing religion or, in most countries, the 
“State Religion,” became a compulsory subject in the State school. Both 
the State school and Religion as a discipline were indeed novelties. The 
framework, its apparent similarity notwithstanding, was rather the oppo-
site of the Medieval one within which schools were almost invariably 
Church-based institutions and Religion was not a subject or a discipline 
but a practice (what was a discipline was instead theology, taught to those 
who reached the top level in education). 
One invisible implication was a division of labour between the lay 
ruling elite and the Churches, namely a tacit agreement according to 
which Homer belonged to the secular ruling class and the Bible was the 
clergy’s private property, which would never be made the subject of a 
critical-historical study as the former instead was expected to be. 
3. A result of the mentioned tacit pact between two ruling groups was that 
the canon of European culture was transformed into something less con-
sistent and less comprehensive than its previous post-Renaissance version 
had been. In more detail, the tradition to be transmitted to younger gener-
ations was construed around a fable, or better a lie, namely that the mod-
ern European is the ancient Greek’s grandson, and the ancient Hebrew 
had nothing to bequest to the Modern European. Besides, the canon was 
reduced to a bark without a kernel, in so far as literature and history took 
the place that used to belong to “philosophy” or to Studia Humanitatis.  
 
4. MORAL TRADITIONS, RELIGIONS, POLITICAL  
 INSTITUTIONS, AND CRITICAL REFLECTION  
 
The morale of my story is the following:  
A study of the history of moral (and religious and political) ideas 
combined with critical reflection on social practices should provide the 
core or the leading subject in education. The large-scale Spanish experi-
ment, and the small-scale Belgian one, in teaching ethics as a subject 
alternative to the teaching of the Catholic or Protestant religion are not 
bad examples for possible future developments. The Swedish experiment 
that made room for comparative religious studies as a subject substituting 
religious instruction is another interesting example. Yet, both are just 
interesting starting points, not viable general answers to the question I 
have asked. The problem with both experiments is being the result of 
piecemeal social engineering. In the Spanish case ethics is an alternative 
to religion as if those who want to learn about one religion did not need 
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to learn about ethics and could go on ignoring the existence of more than 
one religion, and those who want to learn about ethics would better ig-
nore the existence of religions. In the Swedish case the study of religions 
in a comparative outlook is one half of the right answer but it leaves the 
other half, i.e. morality, aside. 
The open questions are: (i) why should ethics be an alternative to 
religion? Do those who are educated into one religion – which I assume 
should be done outside a public educational system – need not to learn 
anything about ethics?; (ii) why should children of Protestants, Jews, and 
Atheists learn about religions and not about morality?; (iii) why should 
the study of religions be a separate subject, unless it is so just because of 
historical reasons, that is, the fact of having taken the place of confes-
sional religious instruction? Wouldn’t the study of history gain from be-
coming less a study of political history and more a study of social history 
as well as of the history of religious/moral/political movements from 
Buddhism and Judaism to Cynicism, Epicureanism and so on? 
My practical recommendations are: 
1. Abolishing the teaching of religion in schools where it still exists; this 
may happen hopefully without ideological wars, as the result of a dia-
logue between the civil society and the Churches, where the latter may 
understand that they may forfeit various kinds of control over public edu-
cation while winning the more valuable promise of a society where citi-
zens will learn in a critical way about the Bible, the Qurān, the Buddhist 
canon, and Confucius. 
2. Abolishing any kind of political education as a separate subject, that is, 
subjects like the Italian educazione civica or the Spanish educación para 
la ciudadanía should go under the heading “ethics.” 
3. Establishing one subject named “ethics,” compulsory for all, that is, 
for children of Islamic no less than of Atheist parents, with a syllabus 
including: a) critical reflection on values, norms, and institutions regulat-
ing private/social lives in our society as well as in other societies starting 
with examples from everyday life, the media, literature, and history and 
reaching the study of sources from Confucius and Homer to Cicero, 
Aquinas, Luther, Calvin, Voltaire... up to Peter Singer; b) critical reflec-
tion on the structure and normative justification of national and interna-
tional political institutions and legal codes.  
4. Revising the syllabus of the subject “history” in such a way as to cut 
down the room assigned to political history and give the spare room to 
social history and history of religions and moralities. This should start 
with critical reflection on religious beliefs and practices followed by var-
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ious communities in our societies (plus rituals, customs, symbolic prac-
tices with an apparently non-religious character) compared with those of 
different societies, reaching a study of sources such as the Bible, the 
Talmud, the Qurān, Aquinas, Luther, Calvin, Voltaire, Marx, Nietzsche, 
etc.  
5. Revising the syllabus of the subject “literature” in order to transform it 
into comparative literature, that is: (i) abolishing the dominating notion of 
“Classics” (that is Hellenic and Roman religious or mythological texts 
plus some profane poetry which have been falsely believed to be the 
source of secular modern civilization); (ii) establishing the study, besides 
national and modern European literature, of basic texts from the various 
world civilizations, Chinese, Indian, Egyptian, and Hebrew, Hellenic, 
Roman, Christian, Islamic; this would carry a study of the Egyptian Book 
of the Dead, the Indian Bhagavad Gītā, the Babylonian Epic of Gilga-
mesh and Qoheleht as texts with an equal status to Ilyad, Odyssey, and 
Aeneids, as well as a study of the latter as serious texts, not just as either 
literature for fun or tools for philological torture. 
The rationale of my practical recommendations is that education in 
a liberal-democratic society may not be socialization into the given set of 
values of a national community but should be just training to critical 
thinking.  
 
 
